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Schemes for compensating injury which operate alongside each other call for 
important policy decisions to be made concerning their inter-relationship. Are they to 
take account of one another and, if so, to what extent? These issues can arise in a 
variety of contexts. Within particular regimes they are the concern, for example, of 
the overlapping benefit regulations in social security law and the rules relating to 
contribution in insurance law.  However, the focus of this article is upon personal 
injury litigation. It examines the policy reasons which have been used to justify the 
different results reached by the law when faced with the problem of “collateral 
benefits” received by an accident victim also seeking damages. Typically these 
benefits are received from the state, or an employer, or an insurer. Two major 
questions then arise: should they be taken into account to reduce the damages 
payable by the tortfeasor; and should those who provide the additional source of 
compensation be able to obtain reimbursement of the monies they have paid out? 
The area has recently been investigated by the Law Commission as part of its 
programme reviewing the law of damages for personal injury. The policy analysis 
presented in this article is somewhat broader than that discussed in the 
Commission‟s Consultation Paper issued in September 1997.
1
 Although this article 
does not set out to examine the individual proposals for reform suggested by the 
Commission, it does provide an additional perspective from which they may be 
evaluated. It identifies certain common themes in the policy arguments even though 
the particular collateral benefits involved may be quite different in source, aim and 
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character. Although subject to many qualifications, these recurring arguments are 
organised here into a framework which can be used to evaluate new cases and 
reconsider the policy issues. 
The subject is therefore topical. It also constitutes a neglected and yet important 
area of compensation law. Before the Law Commission review comparatively little 
had been written on collateral benefits in spite of the fact that it is difficult to over-
estimate the importance of coordinating the plethora of compensation schemes for 
those injured.
 2
 Over fifty forms of financial assistance for disablement have been 
traced.
3
 The series of ad-hoc schemes exposes the lack of any coherent policy 
towards the treatment of disabled people. Some receive much more help than 
others even though their needs and injuries are the same. It is not only the particular 
conditions of entitlement which cause the inequalities of treatment, but also the 
differing provisions with regard to the receipt of collateral benefits. The fortunate few 
who are able to obtain compensation from the common law are especially well 
treated. Because of their collateral benefits some plaintiffs recover far more than 
their pecuniary loss.
4
 This waste involved in paying what may amount to double 
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compensation is a feature of tort law which has been highlighted by Atiyah.
5
 
Although his general views on reform of the law are not shared by the present Law 
Commission, it now recognises   
“ ... the force of the contention that the damages burden should be 
reduced by the amount of collateral benefits so that money could 
thereby be released to contributors to liability insurance through lower 
premiums, which would in turn potentially increase the funds available 
to achieve better provision for all the ill and injured.”
6
 
The questions posed by collateral benefits therefore lie at the heart of any 
compensation system, and constitute the key to its future direction. 
1. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE POLICY QUESTIONS 
In summary, there are three potential solutions to the problems posed by collateral 
benefits: 
(i) Cumulation  
Here the damages take no account of the other sources of compensation. The 
plaintiff receives damages in full, irrespective of the extent to which his losses may 
already have been made good by other sources. For plaintiffs this is the most 
favourable of the three solutions because it enables them to receive multiple 
compensation without being required to repay the sources of their collateral benefits. 
The result is sometimes called an application of the “collateral source” rule.
7
 At first 
sight the plaintiff appears to be overcompensated and this wasteful solution seems 
to have little to commend it. However, arguments can be made to support the rule 
especially where damages alone are seen as inadequate compensation, or where 
the plaintiff has paid for the collateral benefits and is thought to have a right to the 
extra money. 
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(ii) Recoupment 
By contrast this solution arranges for the collateral source to be reimbursed and 
thus prevents the plaintiff from being overcompensated. It also ensures that the 
wrongdoer does not benefit from the payments made by the collateral source. 
Although these payments may help to meet the plaintiff‟s immediate needs, 
ultimately they must be refunded by the tortfeasor. If the administrative cost of 
repaying the benefits is not excessive, this solution on the surface appears the most 
attractive. 
(iii) Reduction 
Here the damages are reduced by the amount of benefit received, but the 
collateral source is given no right to seek reimbursement. This produces the most 
favourable result for defendants because not only do they pay less money to 
plaintiffs, but they also have no duty to refund the payments from the collateral 
sources. Although this simple rule can be criticised as providing a subsidy to 
tortfeasors, it avoids the wasteful litigation and administrative cost sometimes 
associated with recoupment.  
2. THE USE OF PRINCIPLE  
Judges have often been uncertain which of these three policy solutions to adopt 
and yet have been reluctant to discuss them in detail. Instead they have frequently 
merely reformulated the problem of whether or not to deduct benefit by using the 
language of causation, or focusing upon the meaning of the word “collateral,” or 
simply by asking what is fair, just and reasonable. They have preferred to apply 
principle rather than policy. That is, they have preferred the formal language of legal 
rules and concepts to discussion of more pragmatic considerations. This has 
hindered rational discussion of the subject. 
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(i) Meaning Of Collateral 
Little can be solved by simply asking “is this benefit collateral or not?”
 8
 The 
benefit will be called collateral if it is to be deducted, but it will not be if it is to be left 
out of account.
9
 There is no inherent meaning in the word which can be used as a 
litmus paper test to solve the problem. Nor are the difficulties avoided by translating 
the question into Latin and asking whether the benefit is a res inter alios acta for the 
same objections then apply. 
(ii) Just, Fair And Reasonable 
Similarly, the simple assertion by a judge that the result is fair or just is of little 
value. An illustration of this approach is to be found in Browning v War Office
10
 
where Lord Denning suggested that although it could be difficult “to say when it is or 
is not fair and just to take the receipts into account” it would “obviously” not be fair in 
particular cases.
11
 
(iii) Cause In Law 
Causal language alone cannot determine whether there is a sufficient relationship 
between the injury and the receipt of compensation for deduction to be made. To 
ask whether the accident is the “direct”, “effective” or “proximate” cause of the 
plaintiff receiving the non-tort monies (therefore making them deductible) does not 
help if we accept these words are so variable in meaning as to be worthless. Again 
matters are not improved if the question is translated into Latin and we ask whether 
the accident is the causa causans of the additional payments.
12
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Nevertheless it has been common for judges to use causation to justify their 
decisions on collateral benefit. For example, in the leading case dealing with the 
non-deductibility of payments from a charitable fund it was argued that it was not the 
tort which had caused the payments to be made; instead they derived only from the 
generosity of the contributors.
13
 Again in the leading case dealing with insurance 
receipts it was argued that the plaintiff “does not receive [his insurance money] 
because of the accident, but because he had made a contract providing for that 
contingency.”
 14
 Of course, the insurance payments were in fact made because of 
the accident in the sense that if it had not occurred they would not have been made. 
But that is not what the judge meant by his causal language. He was asserting that, 
although the accident caused the payment in fact, it ought not to be considered the 
cause of the payment in law. However, that is the statement of a conclusion rather 
than a rational argument made in support of it. The decision cannot be justified by 
the use of causal language alone.  
Judges have become more critical of the assertions rooted in such language, and 
have gradually abandoned the cause in law argument. For example, in Parry v 
Cleaver four of the five members of the House of Lords clearly rejected the use of 
causation as a means for solving the problem. The one exception was Lord 
Pearson, but even he made no mention of causation when he later chaired the 
Royal Commission on Civil Liability.
15
 In spite of these criticisms causation is still 
occasionally employed to help determine collateral benefit cases.
16
  
(iv) Cause In Fact 
Unlike cause in law, cause in fact can be relevant in deciding whether or not to 
deduct the benefit from tort damages. For a deduction to be made it is essential, 
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although not sufficient by itself, to show that the accident is the necessary cause of 
the payment of benefit. The key question is: “If there were no accident would the 
plaintiff still have received the benefit?” If so, the accident is not the cause in fact of 
the payment and it should be left out of account when damages are assessed. For 
example, in order to deduct a redundancy payment from damages it must be shown 
that it was the injury to the plaintiff, and not other factors, which caused him to be 
made redundant.
17
 
Just as plaintiffs can only claim for harm caused by the accident, defendants 
cannot expect damages to be mitigated by factors unrelated to the accident. If the 
accident forces the plaintiff to draw upon his bank savings, the proceeds are not to 
be taken into account in assessing damages because he would have had access to 
this money even if there were no accident: 
“... it is perfectly clear that he is not made whole until he again has that 
money to put in the bank for his children, or his old age, or even to 
squander, as he had planned.”
18
 
In this respect damages are assessed irrespective of the plaintiff‟s actual need for 
them so that, for example, no notice is taken of the fact that the accident victim is 
very rich and can easily pay for medical treatment. In this way the defendant must 
take the plaintiff as he finds him. Similarly, no account is taken of the fortunes of life 
which benefit the plaintiff after the accident occurred provided that the accident did 
not help to produce such good fortune. If, for example, the plaintiff wins the lottery 
the day after he suffers his accident, his windfall is not caused by the accident and 
will be irrelevant to the amount of damages he receives. 
Cause in fact, therefore, is relevant in determining whether the necessary 
conditions are present for there to be further consideration of whether benefits 
should be deducted from tort damages. The outcome of that further debate will 
depend upon which of the policy solutions considered in the next section is 
preferred. The application of principle has been of little help. 
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3. REVIEW OF THE POLICY OF CUMULATION 
Objections To Cumulation 
There are several obvious objections to allowing plaintiffs to receive damages in 
full irrespective of the extent to which losses may already have been made good by 
other sources. First, this cumulation seems contrary to certain basic tenets of the 
award of damages. 
“The underlying principle is, of course, that damages are 
compensatory. They are not designed to put the [injured party] ... in a 
better financial position than that in which he would otherwise have 
been if the accident had not occurred.”
19
 
The often stated aim
20
 of returning the plaintiff as far as possible to the position 
which he was in before the accident occurred suggests that all receipts resulting 
from the accident should be brought into account. Similarly, the principle that after 
the accident the plaintiff should be required to mitigate his loss seems to require 
notice to be taken of other sources of help available to him. Cumulation allows over-
compensation to occur and this is contrary to these principles of the law of damages 
and the rationale of economic efficiency which lies behind them. Cumulation has 
instead been associated with a desire to ensure that wrongdoers pay in full for 
injuries they cause, and this philosophy of punishment is incompatible with tort‟s aim 
of paying no more than full compensation. 
A second objection is that cumulation allows some accident victims to be treated 
very generously compared to others, a disparity which is made more acute if social 
security provision for disabled people is considered meagre. It appears very unfair 
that the few accident victims able to succeed in tort should be able to claim so much 
more for the same losses. Finally, cumulation appears to result in the compensation 
system being more expensive than it need be. It is argued that the bill for the overall 
compensation system is ultimately borne by the public as a whole,
21
 and in order to 
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allocate as efficiently as possible the scarce resources available, care should be 
taken to ensure that the same item of loss is not compensated twice over. 
Cumulation seems profligate and wasteful. As Atiyah argues:  
“Public money should not be wasted by over-compensating some 
personal injury victims, particularly when so many other deserving 
cases ... receive much less ....”
22
  
We now consider the arguments that may be used to counter these basic 
criticisms of the collateral source rule. 
(i) Is Cumulation Justified If The Plaintiff Has Paid For, Or Otherwise Earned, 
The Additional Payments?  
If the plaintiff has earned the extra money why should the defendant benefit? The 
argument in favour of cumulation is stronger if any of the following apply:- 
 The plaintiff freely chose to buy the additional benefits from his own 
disposable income and was not required to do so by, for example, his 
employer or by the national insurance system.  
 The plaintiff acted prudently and with foresight in purchasing the additional 
payments.
23
  
 The denial of the additional payment robbed the plaintiff of all benefit from 
the contract he entered into in order to secure it.
24
 
                                                                                                                                        
public money, since they are mostly financed by ... insurance premiums which are paid by a very 
large proportion of the public.” 
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 The plaintiff reasonably expected to receive the payment in addition to any 
tort damages.   
However, there are a number of difficulties with these arguments which diminish 
their persuasiveness. There are five major points to be made:- 
(a) The plaintiff may not have paid for the additional payments nor exercised 
foresight and prudence to obtain them 
Where the plaintiff purchases private insurance he may indeed be acting with 
foresight and care in arranging to pay the premiums from his disposable income. But 
often this picture of self-sufficiency, prudence and thrift is inaccurate. First, the 
premiums may be paid by someone other than the plaintiff (as where employers 
arrange medical or accident or disablement insurance). Secondly, the plaintiff may 
have had no choice but to become a beneficiary of the insurance policy. This may 
happen not only where the insurance benefit is part of the remuneration for a job, 
but also in other circumstances where in practice it is difficult to avoid becoming 
insured.
25
 Thirdly, the purchase of insurance does not necessarily indicate either 
thrift or foresight. On thrift the Law Commission note that the prudent course might 
be not to buy insurance if it does not represent value for money.
26
 As for foresight, it 
can be agreed that the motive for buying insurance may be to provide security in the 
event of an accident. But the reason for the purchase will rarely be to  arrange for 
double recovery in the much less likely event of the injury being caused by a tort.
27
 
In summary this means that the plaintiff may be unaware of the full extent of the 
insurance protection from which he benefits, and his privileged position may not 
result from his own prudent management of his affairs.  
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Where the benefit derives from work the plaintiff can argue that it has been paid 
for, at least indirectly, by his labour. In effect the cost of the insurances and benefits 
supplied by the employer is an addition to the plaintiff‟s salary, and can determine 
whether or not employment is accepted.
28
 However, if the plaintiff pays for the extra 
benefits in this indirect way, his argument for retaining them is weaker than where he 
buys the insurance himself. Where the additional benefit is provided by the state the 
plaintiff‟s argument becomes even more difficult to sustain. National insurance 
contributions nowadays are far more akin to levies of taxation than payments of 
private insurance premiums. Even forty years ago a Departmental Committee was 
able to reject the comparison between the contributions for private insurance on the 
one hand and public insurance on the other.
29
 This was because national insurance 
contributions are compulsory and not the result of individual thrift; the insured is not 
responsible for paying all the premiums because the employer is also required to 
make a contribution; and finally, the National Insurance fund which results is 
insufficiently separated from the pool into which general tax revenues are paid.
30
  
Cumulation is easier to justify where the collateral benefits are not universal or 
obtained as a matter of routine. When the policy of cumulation was first adopted in 
the nineteenth century markets for first party personal injury insurance were only just 
developing, and other forms of collective protection were very limited. From the 
defendant‟s perspective it could not really be expected that the injured person would 
carry any protection. However, this has changed with the twentieth century 
development of both public and private forms of welfare. It has been suggested in 
the USA that the changes made to social insurance and employment benefits since 
only the 1950‟s justify abrogating the policy of cumulation.
31
 However, where this 
has led to the removal of the traditional collateral source rule an exception has often 
been made for life insurance. The reason for this is that  
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“... life insurance continues to be  acquired in accordance with 
nineteenth-century norms. Many people purchase life insurance but 
others do not .... [T]he face amount varies dramatically from policy to 
policy, and remains a matter of individual choice. Furthermore, the cost 
... is borne by the individual who purchases the policy.”
32
 
In summary the strongest arguments for allowing multiple compensation occur 
where the collateral payments are uncommon, and derive from schemes to which 
the plaintiff makes a contribution from his own disposable income. However, even 
then there remain the criticisms of the collateral source rule considered in the next 
four headings.   
(b) If the plaintiff has paid for the additional payments he does not pay for tort 
damages in the same sense 
The argument that the plaintiff has paid a price for his additional payments can be 
countered by noting that a reduction is sought not in the monies from the collateral 
source, but in the damages awarded at common law.
33
 It is possible to reduce these 
damages because the right to them has not been bought in the same way as that to 
payment under an insurance policy. Plaintiffs do not pay directly for the monies they 
receive from the tort system -  they do not pay premiums into an insurance fund in 
order to gain compensation. Instead they rely upon the defendant having the 
capacity to pay damages, and this usually means that they rely upon the defendant 
having paid liability insurance premiums. Although it can be argued that these costs 
are passed on and are borne indirectly by society as a whole, a plaintiff‟s entitlement 
to damages bears no relationship to the amount he may have contributed indirectly 
to fund the tort system. He will not therefore have paid for tort damages in the same 
sense as he may have paid for his insurance monies, and therefore it is easier to 
say that the damages should be reduced to ensure that the plaintiff is not over-
compensated.  
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(c) If the additional payments are deducted from damages the plaintiff is not robbed 
of all benefit from the contract giving rise to the payments  
Plaintiffs do not take out first party insurance in order to give themselves extra 
protection against tortious injuries by supplementing the damages that they may 
gain from the common law. Instead they seek protection against all causes of injury, 
whether or not caused by negligence. This protection is far wider than that against 
tortious injuries alone because only a minority of accident victims are able to pursue 
a common law claim. 
It is therefore wrong to suggest that if insurance proceeds are deducted from tort 
damages all the value of the insurance contract is thereby lost. Before the injury 
occurred the plaintiff had the benefit of wide coverage under the policy. If he had 
been unable to claim in tort he would have been able to rely upon his contractual 
rights to obtain compensation. To consider these rights as worthless only because 
the insurance payments are later set off against the damages award is to fail to 
appreciate why such contracts are taken out in the first place. The insurance covers 
the many accidents where no tort is involved. In addition, it provides benefits even to 
those who may be able to claim in tort: 
“... [E]ven if the plaintiff‟s injury is caused tortiously the tortfeasor may 
be insolvent. Beyond this, the plaintiff may prefer to rest content with 
his insurance proceeds and avoid all the time, trouble and uncertainty 
which is necessarily involved in bringing a lawsuit. And even if he is 
prepared to go ahead with litigation, he may need money right away for 
medical and living expenses and find it hard to await upon an eventual 
judgment in his favour.  In effect the person taking out accident 
insurance does so in order to secure himself against the financial 
consequences of an accident and not to indulge himself in the 
speculative gamble of double recovery where his injury is caused 
tortiously.”
34
 
  Another attack on the argument that the plaintiff‟s contract has been completely 
undermined is that it is circular. If the price paid by the plaintiff for the additional 
benefits reflects the ability of the provider to recoup the payments made, then there 
can be no objection. 
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“Insurance and employment benefit arrangements are contractual; the 
price to the beneficiary depends on the scope of benefits agreed upon. 
Should the insurer or employer acquire rights of reimbursement or 
subrogation, the cost of the arrangement to the beneficiary would go 
down. The legal result cannot properly be predicated on the 
consideration paid; rather it must be the other way around.”
35
 
 
(d) It is difficult to establish that the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of 
receiving  payments in addition to damages 
To receive support, the plaintiff‟s expectation of receiving benefit must be 
reasonable. This is harder to establish if the plaintiff has not paid directly for the 
benefit, as may happen in the ways already described. The plaintiff‟s case will be 
stronger if he can establish that he has relied on the expectation of receiving more 
money. However, such reliance often cannot be established because the plaintiff 
before the accident was unaware of the source of additional payments which later 
became available to him. Where there is no reliance, the argument can be turned 
against the plaintiff. If he is deprived of the extra benefits it is sometimes claimed 
that he suffers only the loss of a windfall payment, akin to a successful gambling bet, 
rather than monies which are essential for his future maintenance and well being. 
There is much less reason to support the profits of a gamble
36
 than where the 
plaintiff has a true “insurable interest” where he will suffer a net financial loss unless 
payment in full is made.
37
 It can therefore be difficult to establish that the plaintiff had 
an expectation of receiving additional benefit which the law ought to support. In any 
event, the plaintiff‟s expectation is only one factor in determining whether multiple 
compensation should be allowed. It must be balanced against other policy 
considerations, and cannot alone justify the collateral source rule.  
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(e) Cumulation of payments is not allowed in other compensation contexts and in 
particular is prevented where a tort claim for property damage is involved 
Even though a claimant has bought or earned entitlement to additional payments, 
they may be taken into account in a variety of contexts outside of tort to reduce, or 
even extinguish, the right to other compensation. For example, receipt of insurance 
monies affects entitlement to welfare benefits. It may also reduce the value of a 
claim under another insurance contract relating to the same loss. But the example 
most often used to attack the collateral source rule, even though payment has been 
made for the additional benefit, relates to the tort system itself. It concerns a tort 
claim for damage to property, rather than person. The plaintiff property owner is not 
allowed to retain, in addition to his damages, any insurance monies payable for the 
loss of his property. Instead the insurer is able to exercise subrogation rights and 
recoup from the damages the indemnity it has paid out under the terms of the policy.  
In practice the plaintiff does not bring the tort claim himself, but the insurer does so 
in the plaintiff‟s name. This is in sharp contrast to cases of personal injury where a 
plaintiff is allowed to keep all his damages in addition to any accident or life 
insurance monies.
38
 
Can this different treatment of personal injury as opposed to property damage 
claims be justified? Insurance for property losses is said to have an indemnity basis 
whereas for accident and life assurance it does not. Indemnity means that a precise 
financial value can be placed on the loss and the policyholder is allowed to recover 
only to the limit of this loss. This means that if he has more than one policy, and is 
over-insured, there will be a pro-rata reduction in the amount payable by each policy 
so that no profit can be made. Similarly, if the policyholder is able to make a claim in 
tort as well as on his policy, he must use the proceeds to reimburse the insurer. 
There are two major policy reasons which support this principle of indemnity: first, 
there is a concern to minimise any incentive to fraud by preventing any profit being 
made from the destruction of property; and second, there is a reluctance to 
encourage gambling, the common law treating over-insurance with the suspicion that 
might be due a wagering contract.  
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Unlike property insurance, both accident and life policies are considered non-
indemnity insurances.
39
 The distinction is said to be based on the fact that precise 
financial values cannot be put on a person‟s life or on the disability which may result 
from an accident,
40
 and therefore there is no maximum amount at which the plaintiff 
could be said to be fully indemnified. It is then argued that he should be allowed 
multiple compensation. After all, what is a leg, arm or life worth? The sums must be 
artificial - there are no market values. If a plaintiff suffers paraplegia in a car crash, 
even though he recovers both damages in tort and accident insurance monies, it is 
difficult to assert that he has been overcompensated given that no precise market 
value can be placed upon his pain and suffering and loss of amenity. Nor can we 
suggest, as we could with property insurance, that the cumulation of payment 
provides an incentive for the injury to be caused, and is thus a temptation to fraud; 
self-mutilation in order to obtain insurance monies remains unknown, whereas arson 
to one‟s own property is relatively common. 
But will this distinction between personal injury and property damage survive 
detailed scrutiny?
41
 The Law Commission is not attracted to the argument that 
certain insurance payments are intended for non-pecuniary losses and can never be 
excessive because quantification is imprecise.
42
 Assessments in tort nowadays aim 
to achieve a measure of consistency according to a well recognised tariff of values 
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for non-pecuniary loss. If an injured person were to receive monies on top of a full 
award for pain and suffering and loss of amenity he might be overcompensated. If 
the tort tariff itself is too low, the answer is for it to be reformed rather than permitting 
a random increase in the damages depending upon how much collateral benefit can 
also be claimed.  
Another major difficulty with the argument that there is no overcompensation is 
that a substantial part of the damages awarded for personal injury is for pecuniary 
loss and this can be calculated fairly precisely.
43
 Actuarially, it is possible to measure 
the amount required by the plaintiff to be fully indemnified for his loss of wages or 
costs of care, and the court may have regard to such expert evidence when making 
its assessment. A formula is used based upon the yearly amount of the particular 
loss (the multiplicand), multiplied by the number of years during which that loss is 
expected to occur, less an allowance for the early receipt of payment (the multiplier, 
arrived at by applying the relevant discount rate). Although criticised, this formula is 
an attempt to calculate the financial costs of the accident as precisely as possible. 
This makes a claim for personal injury comparable with property damage, and thus 
undermines the argument that any collateral payments should be ignored. 
In spite of these arguments, the legal effect of insurance payments upon 
damages remains unchanged. The law continues to apply the distinction between 
indemnity and non-indemnity insurance contracts in a mechanical manner treating 
the right to subrogation as arising by operation of law from the classification of the 
contract.
44
 As a result insurance payments are not deducted from damages for 
personal injury. 
(ii) Is Cumulation Justified If The Provider Of The Additional Payments 
Intended Them To Be Cumulative? 
If the donor intends to confer a benefit on the plaintiff, that intention will be 
frustrated if the benefit is taken into account in calculating damages because the 
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effect will be simply to transfer the value of the benefit to the tortfeasor. This not only 
appears unfair but might also deter the donor from offering help in the future. “The 
springs of private charity would be found to be largely, if not entirely, dried up.”
45
 As 
Lord Reid suggested in Parry v Cleaver:
46
  
“It would be revolting to the ordinary man‟s sense of justice, and 
therefore contrary to public policy, that the sufferer should have his 
damages reduced so that he would gain nothing from the benevolence 
of his friends or relations or of the public at large, and that the only 
gainer would be the wrongdoer.” 
However, the argument is not without difficulty. Judges have acknowledged that 
“the concept of „the intent of the person conferring the benefit‟ [is] a somewhat 
elusive one.”
47
 For example, it is often unclear what donors intend when making 
contributions to charity. The vast majority probably give no thought to the 
beneficiaries‟ ability to claim compensation from tort, although none intend to 
subsidise the tortfeasor. Many wish to provide immediate relief to those who have 
suffered rather than to supplement damages if they are eventually obtained. These 
charitable providers could be divided in their responses to the question: “Do you 
wish your contribution to go to the beneficiaries even if their losses have been fully 
compensated from other sources, whilst others suffering similar injuries receive no 
such assistance?” If the situation were properly explained to donors, they might well 
respond that instead of allowing the plaintiff to cumulate benefits, they would prefer 
that their insurance premiums be kept down. 
This brings us to another aspect of the intention of the donor, but one which this 
time justifies the cumulation of benefit. If it is the intention of the donor only to 
provide immediate relief by making a loan to the plaintiff which must be repaid if any 
damages are obtained, receipt of the immediate financial assistance ought not to be 
taken into account later to reduce the award of compensation. This is because there 
will be no overcompensation of the plaintiff; the loan must be repaid. The rule has 
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been supported by law reform bodies.
48
 It is an important one because it is very 
common for today‟s contracts of employment to contain a clause giving the employer 
the right to recoup sickness payments if the claim for damages proves successful.
49
 
It is open to employers to insert similar provisions in their pension arrangements as 
well as any permanent health and redundancy protection they arrange for their 
employees. However, as yet such clauses are rarely inserted into the relevant 
agreements. This is because of a failure to plan for the possibility of a tort claim 
rather than any inherent problem with the concept of inserting such a clause. 
(iii) Is Cumulation Justified If Damages Alone Are Inadequate Compensation?  
The case for the plaintiff keeping both damages and collateral benefits is stronger 
if damages do not fully indemnify against loss. In its empirical survey the Law 
Commission found that two in five recipients of damages thought that their monies 
were insufficient, largely because they believed they were under-compensated for 
loss of earnings.
50
 In order to make up for the shortfall they had cut back on their 
ordinary living expenses. Some had been forced to take out loans or had dipped into 
their savings.  
There are several reasons why the damages may prove insufficient:- 
 Any reduction in the award because of the plaintiff‟s contributory negligence 
may mean that the damages will be insufficient to meet the plaintiff‟s future 
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needs. It has been estimated that the defence reduces damages in about a 
quarter of all settlements, but there are no precise figures.
51
  
 The way in which the courts assess damages can lead to under-compensation. 
Judges have refused to apply actuarial principles in order to assess future loss. 
As a result, they have been accused of making excessive and unjustified 
discounts from what ought to be awarded. For example, they may reduce an 
award to reflect uncertainty about what will happen to the plaintiff in the future - 
including the risks of premature death or redundancy. But in making allowance 
for these “vicissitudes of life,” or “contingencies,” judges have penalised 
plaintiffs more than an actuarial analysis would allow. Similarly, the discount 
rate used to allow for the accelerated receipt of damages has been said to be 
too high.
52
  
 In cases which are settled the risks and the trauma associated with proceeding 
to trial are avoided, and the compensation is received sooner than would 
otherwise be the case. These benefits are inevitably reflected by a discount 
from the damages a court would award.
53
  
 The costs of bringing the action are borne in part by the plaintiff even though 
the claim is successful. A legal aid contribution may be required, or payment to 
the lawyer in excess of that obtained as party and party costs from the 
defendant. In the USA the use of the contingent fee in order to fund the 
                                            
51
 D. Harris et al, Compensation And Support For Illness And Injury (1984) p 91. It is very difficult to 
analyse the effect of the defence upon the level of settlement because the parties do not agree 
whether and to what extent contributory negligence is a factor in the final settlement. A more recent 
study by the Law Commission found at least 12 per cent of recipients of damages awards 
considered that the defence had been relevant in reducing their payments. See How Much Is 
Enough? op cit table 407. In a survey confined to serious injuries - worth at least £150,000 or more - 
although there were clear indications that the defence was used in only nine per cent of cases, it 
featured in negotiations in other cases without its effect being clear. P. Cornes, Coping With 
Catastrophic Injury (1993) p 22.   
52
 For details see Law Commission Report No 224 (1994) Structured Settlements And Interim And 
Provisional Damages Part II and the Consultation Paper No 125 (1992) paras 2.91 - 2.18. The 
discount rate has recently been the subject of litigation, and awaits determination by the House of 
Lords. See Wells v Wells [1997] PIQR Q1. 
53
 Harper and James op cit p 1354 state: “... the double recovery result in the accident insurance 
cases is hard indeed to justify on principle though perhaps it has done little harm in practice for, as 
practical claims men know, the beneficiary of an accident policy is usually willing to settle his tort 
claim for less than he otherwise would.” 
 21 
litigation has often been relied upon to justify the collateral source rule.
54
 The 
lawyer commonly takes up to a third of the damages awarded. However, by 
contrast in Britain the plaintiff is required to make only a limited contribution, 
and the justification for cumulating the collateral benefits has much less force.  
 It has already been suggested that money cannot adequately compensate for 
non-pecuniary losses. Payment for pain and suffering is not an indemnity, and 
it is possible to argue that any sum is insufficient and cumulation should 
therefore be allowed. However, against this it must be recognised that a court 
regards the amount it awards for non-pecuniary loss as a sufficient sum. Within 
the tort system it would not allow a plaintiff to recover more. For example, there 
is no increase in the amount awarded for non-pecuniary loss just because  
more than one tortfeasor is sued. Why then must additional compensation from 
a collateral source be ignored?  
Some of the reasons given above for damages being inadequate cannot alone 
justify collateral monies being left out of account. A more rational compensation 
system would require that more accurate assessment of damages be made rather 
than allowing its deficiencies to be corrected in a haphazard way by the addition of 
collateral monies. It is a matter of luck whether the plaintiff has recourse to such 
additional payments, and they bear no relationship to the extent that there would 
otherwise be undercompensation. As Luntz states: 
“The remedy for underestimation of the loss is to make the estimating 
process more scientific, not to adopt a swings and roundabouts 
approach which offsets a loss suffered by many plaintiffs with fortuitous 
gains to some.”
55
 
 
The Law Commission agree: if damages do not fully compensate that problem must 
be addressed directly.
56
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   (iv) Is Cumulation Justified If Damages Are Awarded For Purposes Different 
From The Additional Payments? 
If the purpose of the additional payment is to replace something with a clear 
financial value, and that purpose would be exactly duplicated by part of the damages 
award, there is less reason for the award to ignore the additional payment. It 
appears wasteful to compensate for a particular need that has already been 
satisfied. However, if the payment is made for some purpose different from that of 
the damages award then it is more likely to be left out of account. 
This argument is used to justify offsetting types of benefit only against their 
corresponding part of the damages award. For example, the Pearson Commission 
proposed that damages be divided into three elements: compensation for lost 
income, for expenses, and for non-pecuniary loss.
57
 It then classified a number of 
social security benefits as falling within one of these three categories and proposed 
that they could only be offset against the relevant part of the damages award. This 
would mean that benefits for sickness and invalidity could only be taken into account 
to reduce the damages for the loss of income caused by the accident; if these 
damages were reduced because of contributory negligence so that the amount 
received for lost income was less than the benefits received, the surplus benefit 
could not be set off against the non-pecuniary part of the damages award.  
The argument also helps to explain the result in the leading case of Parry v 
Cleaver.
58
 It was agreed that the sick pay was to be deducted from the damages for 
lost earnings, but the disablement pension was not. This was because the pension 
would have been paid even if the plaintiff had been able to obtain other work and so 
earn during the relevant period, whereas there would then have been no entitlement 
to the sick pay. By contrast, the dissenting judges considered the pension to be a 
form of deferred pay, analogous to wages, and therefore deductible. The Law 
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Commission is very critical of the majority view and suggests that the attempt to 
characterise the payments as different in kind is unsustainable.
59
 
In the USA the suggestion that the collateral source rule be abolished and that all 
additional payments be brought into account has often been subject to the exception 
that the proceeds of a life insurance policy are to be ignored. This is because such 
policies are not only purchased to provide financial cover in the event of death, but 
also as a form of investment and saving. The different purpose justifies treatment 
which is distinct from accident, health or disability insurance.
60
 
The strength of the argument depends upon the purposes of both the damages 
award and the collateral benefit being clear, and this may not be the case. For 
example, in settlements of tort claims, as opposed to the cases which are 
determined by a court, there is no agreed division of the compensation into 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss. Using these categories it can also be difficult to 
classify certain payments. To what extent is a fixed amount under a private 
insurance policy a payment for the financial effects of injury as opposed to the loss 
of amenity that may result? Subdividing the compensation may not only be complex 
but also unrealistic because it may not correspond to how the recipient perceives his 
damages to have been computed. Finally, the more precise the set off, the less 
scope there is to avoid cumulation of damages, with the result that the gap is 
widened between those who obtain damages and those who are left to rely upon 
social security benefits.
61
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 (v) Is Cumulation Justified If The Expense Of Avoiding It Is High? 
It may be administratively too burdensome and too costly to prevent cumulation 
by, for example, arranging for the collateral sources to be reimbursed. This is 
considered below in relation to the policy of recoupment. 
(vi) Is Cumulation Justified If It Prevents The Tortfeasor Receiving The 
Benefit? 
The price required to avoid cumulation may prove unacceptable if it involves 
subsidising the tortfeasor. There may be moral and economic reasons why the 
defendant‟s burden should not be reduced. These are considered  below in relation 
to the policy of reduction. 
4. REVIEW OF THE POLICY OF RECOUPMENT 
On the surface recoupment seems the most attractive of the solutions to the 
problems posed by the overlap of benefits: it prevents the over-compensation of the 
plaintiff, as discussed above in relation to the policy of cumulation; and it avoids 
subsidising the defendant, discussed below in relation to the policy of reduction. 
Reimbursing the collateral source is especially attractive to those concerned about 
the wasteful aspects of the tort system for, in theory, money could be saved and 
reallocated to those who are seriously disabled but unable to mount a tort claim. 
Damages are obtained only by a small minority of  accident victims and these, in 
turn, constitute but a fraction of those disabled from all causes. If money could be 
transferred from the “elite” group
62
 to those less fortunate there would be a more 
equitable distribution of the finite resources available. The difficulty with this lies in 
the presumption that recipients of tort damages are indeed over-compensated, and 
that any savings made could be reallocated easily to equitably compensate others. 
In practice the savings are likely only to boost insurers‟ profits, or lower the 
premiums they charge. If a collateral source is refunded, the monies are rarely 
earmarked for reallocation for similar purposes. Instead the savings are absorbed 
into the general pool. This also happens, for example, where the state reduces 
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expenditure by “targeting” benefits for disabled people more precisely. The savings 
made are not used to improve allied provision but disappear instead into the general 
coffers of the Treasury. In short, although in theory recoupment appears to offer the 
possibility of an equitable redistribution of resources, in practice it rarely occurs. 
Apart from difficulties with this wider policy goal, there are other problems associated 
with recoupment. In particular, it may be administratively difficult to bring a third party 
into the proceedings, and it could prove costly to do so compared to the amount of 
money recouped.  
The Expense And Administrative Burden Of Recoupment 
A common criticism of recoupment is that it could prove expensive when 
compared to the value of the benefit clawed back. It requires the collateral payments 
or services to be valued, and arrangements to be made for the source to be 
reimbursed. This may mean that the source is joined as a third party to the 
proceedings brought by the plaintiff. Alternatively, the source may have to bring 
proceedings itself for the support it has given and make a claim either directly in its 
own name or on behalf of the accident victim. Depending on the circumstance, the 
collateral source may have to bear the cost of the litigation. This could be 
considerable, especially if it is necessary to establish that the injury was caused by 
another‟s wrongdoing. The uncertainties and risks attached to the fault principle are 
well known and may make the game of recoupment not worth the candle, one 
commentator going as far saying it is “economically ludicrous.”
63
 More moderately, 
Kimball and Davis conclude, as most academics have, that “there may be many 
problems to which abrogation of subrogation would be a  desirable solution ....”
64
 
It is largely because of the potential costs involved that insurers make little use of 
their right of subrogation. Although empirical evidence is sparse, one study of 
insurance practice in the USA suggests that the cost of subrogation in less serious 
accidents could amount to half of the sum claimed.
65
 As a result insurers often allow 
tortfeasors to escape without paying for the damage they cause because it is too 
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expensive or difficult to do otherwise. Both fire and household insurances illustrate 
the limited use of recoupment. Recoveries in respect of such policies are less than 
one per cent of the losses paid.
66
 Although more use is made of subrogation where 
property damage to motor vehicles is involved,
67
 insurers again have found the 
potential costs prohibitive. As a result, insurers have entered into “knock for knock” 
agreements with other insurers. Under such agreements, even though an insurer 
has paid for the damage done to a vehicle owned by one of its comprehensively 
insured policyholders, it is obliged not to pursue an action against the driver who 
caused that damage provided that he was insured by the other party to the 
agreement. The premise is that whatever the insurer loses in this particular case he 
will regain in the next, and the costs of litigating will have been saved. These 
agreements between motor insurers were first made as long ago as the beginning of 
this century and have been widely used. They have also been extended to other 
forms of insurance
68
 and are widespread in France and Germany.
69
 Although they 
have declined in importance in the 1990‟s, this does not mean that insurers have 
become more enthusiastic about subrogation, but only that they no longer subscribe 
to the premise that each carries a proportionate share of the bad risks.
70
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With regard to statutory rights to seek reimbursement, Cane notes another 
example of the potentially high cost of collecting the payment.
71
 At present the NHS 
is allowed to recoup from insurers only some of the cost of its treatment of the 
victims of motor vehicle accidents. The cost of collecting the relatively small sum 
involved is about a quarter of the value of the proceeds. It would be far more 
efficient instead to increase the general level of taxation of insurers, although of 
course this is imprecise and penalises those who insure the safer risks. 
In favour of recoupment it must be emphasised that the greater the amount of 
benefit available for clawback, the greater the likelihood that the costs involved will 
prove worthwhile. In addition, measures can be taken to improve its cost 
effectiveness. These include imposing a threshold level of recovery below which 
recoupment is not to operate. However, in assessing the economic efficiency of 
recoupment it is not sufficient to look only at the costs incurred by the agency 
seeking reimbursement. Subrogation, for example, has been heavily criticised as 
encouraging overlapping policies - both loss and liability insurances may be  taken 
out for the same risks in respect of the same damage.
72
 This benefits only insurers. 
In addition, if the plaintiff and the defendant are engaged in the same activity, the 
reallocation of the loss as a result of subrogation may have no effect upon the group 
that ultimately shoulders the burden. For example, after a car accident an insurer 
might try to recoup the compensation it has paid out for vehicle damage, but this 
may serve only to redistribute the burden from one group of drivers to another. 
Motorists overall will bear the loss. The cost of shifting the exact incidence of 
payment in such a case is wasteful.  
The Mechanism For Arranging Recoupment 
Recoupment depends not only upon the collateral source having a financial 
incentive to take action, but also upon the opportunities provided by the legal system 
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to bring the relevant proceedings.
73
 To obtain reimbursement it may be necessary 
for the collateral source to make a claim against the tortfeasor or even against the 
plaintiff himself:  
 Against the tortfeasor, the source may rely upon a right of subrogation and 
bring the action in the plaintiff‟s name. Alternatively, there may be a 
statutory right to recoup the monies, as where the state is able to obtain 
reimbursement of its social security payments. In the past there have also 
been attempts to bring an action in quasi-contract for money paid by the 
collateral source to the use of the defendant.
74
 
 Although actions brought by providers of collateral benefits against the 
recipients of damages are almost unknown, there are several theoretical 
bases upon which they may be founded. First, reliance may be placed 
upon a condition imposed by the court when awarding damages that part 
of the money be used to repay the provider of the additional benefit.
75
 
Some cases have specifically held that the plaintiff should hold part of the 
damages on trust,
76
 although there are considerable difficulties in the use 
of this concept.
77
 It is also theoretically possible for the collateral source to 
rely upon the concept of unjust enrichment in the law of restitution.
78
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Indeed this has been seen as the main basis for subrogation itself.
79
 
Finally, and most important in relation to sick pay schemes, the provider of 
the benefit may rely upon a contractual right to repayment as where 
monies are advanced on the condition that they will be returned in the 
event of the victim‟s claim for damages proving successful. 
However, in the absence of appropriate legal concepts recoupment will not be 
possible. There may then be no mechanism for the court to arrange for recoupment 
no matter how much it may think it a desirable policy to pursue. 
5. REVIEW OF THE POLICY OF REDUCTION 
Although this policy reduces damages by the amount of benefit received, it does 
not require the collateral source to be reimbursed. Therefore, of the three policies 
identified in this chapter, reduction is the most favourable to  defendants. They not 
only pay less money to plaintiffs but they also avoid paying anything to the collateral 
sources. On the surface this solution seems the least attractive of the three. It 
appears to subsidise the wrongdoer at the expense of the Good Samaritan and thus 
offends our sense of morality. Reduction also undermines the deterrent aspect of 
the law of tort. It limits the financial penalty imposed for careless behaviour and thus 
lessens the incentive to minimise the risk of causing injury. In summary, the 
objection is that it reduces the extent to which the tortfeasor bears responsibility for 
his actions. However, the policy of reduction can be defended on the basis of its 
simplicity. In particular, it avoids the transfer costs associated with recoupment and 
the wasteful duplication of payment which may result from cumulation. 
Although generally in tort law the aim of awarding just compensation has taken 
precedence over that of deterrence,
80
 there are a few collateral benefit cases where 
courts have specifically referred to their desire to punish the defendant as a 
wrongdoer. He is made to pay in full and is said not to deserve to benefit from the 
generosity of the third party:
81
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“... in these cases the courts measure „compensation‟ by the total 
amount of harm done, even though some of it has been repaired by 
the collateral source, not by what it would take to make the plaintiff 
whole. It is „compensation‟ in a purely Pickwickian sense that only half 
conceals an emphasis upon what the defendant should pay rather than 
on what the plaintiff should get.”
82
 
 
The result of this change of emphasis is that the policy of reduction is abandoned in 
favour of cumulation or recoupment.  
However, this desire to ensure that the defendant gets his just deserts by 
preventing him from transferring responsibility for payment to another can be 
misplaced, especially given the extent to which individual responsibility for 
wrongdoing has already been removed from the tort system. The arguments against 
reduction of damages lose much of their force if we move away from injuries which 
have been caused deliberately and consider instead those caused by negligence. In 
very few of these cases are tortfeasors required to pay damages personally. There 
are many reasons for doubting whether the law can act effectively as a deterrent in 
such cases.
83
 In particular, it is hard to see how the policy of reduction could have 
any effect on the extent that undue risks are taken. In summary, these reasons are 
as follows: 
 Fear of civil liability plays little or no part in regulating risk taking behaviour. 
The deterrent aspect is removed because of the protection afforded by 
liability insurance. The great majority of defendants found liable in tort do 
not pay damages; their insurers do so.
84
 The defendant may suffer little, if 
at all, financially: even future insurance premiums are likely to remain 
unaffected.
85
 People take care to avoid causing injury not because of fear 
of civil liability, but because they wish to reduce the risk of injuring 
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themselves, their property or other people. Self preservation and a natural 
concern for the safety of others are the important motivating factors. 
Finally, it is clear that the possibility of being found guilty of a crime is far 
more effective as a specific deterrent than the imposition of civil liability. 
 The vast majority of claims for compensation from tort do not involve 
intentional wrongdoing where injury is inflicted as a result of obviously 
reprehensible conduct. Instead most claims result from accidents which are 
the product of a moment‟s inattention or slip. Many of these errors in fact 
are ones we all make frequently, but fortunately they result in no injury and 
no tort action because, for example, there was no oncoming car at the 
time. Other errors arise where people are not conscious that they are 
involved in a risky activity. As a result, it is difficult to characterise the 
wrongdoing as morally bad.
86
 The possibility of influencing the natural 
behaviour in which such mistakes arise is very limited so that it is difficult to 
reduce the incidence of injury. 
 Tort imposes liability upon the basis of rules which are vague and provide 
little guidance in advance as to the action that should be taken. For 
example, tort‟s simple exhortation to take care and drive at a reasonable 
speed is of little value to the learner driver. By contrast, the criminal law 
provides a much clearer indication of what is required.  
 Apart from this uncertainty of what standard of care the law demands in a 
given situation, there is also uncertainty about the ability of courts to 
adjudicate upon accidents long after they happened. At one extreme it has 
even been suggested that the forensic process is so flawed that the parties 
might as well toss a coin instead to establish liability.
87
 Apart from 
difficulties in assembling and presenting evidence of wrongdoing, there is 
also concern about how judges might interpret it for they are naturally 
inclined to make some provision for the tragic victims of accidents coming 
before them. Legal practitioners are only too aware that liability is 
                                            
86
 Diplock LJ in Browning v War Office [1963] 1 QB 750 at p 764 deliberately used the word defendant 
“rather than applying ... so emotive a label as „wrongdoer‟ or even „tortfeasor,‟ for the emotions with 
which these latter expressions are charged tend ... to obscure ... the realities of the situation in the 
modern world.”  
87
 D. W. Elliott and H. Street, Road Accidents (1968) p 243. 
 32 
sometimes imposed out of natural sympathy for the victim rather than 
because of the wrongdoing of the defendant. Again this suggests that the 
policy of reduction could be supported in certain cases, and may be 
especially appropriate where the defendant, although found liable, in fact 
may have done little wrong. 
 The extent of the damages the defendant is required to pay bears little 
relationship to the amount of his wrongdoing. There is no norm of damages 
which has been set for particular acts of negligence.
88
 If damage does not 
result nothing is to be paid. If loss is caused the compensation will depend 
not upon the degree of fault, but upon the extent of injury, including the 
particular earning capacity of the plaintiff. That is, the policy of reduction 
could be applied without necessarily reducing the deterrent below that 
appropriate for the particular act of negligence. 
As a result of these and other attacks upon the deterrent effect of tort law, the 
Law Commission conclude that 
“... as tort law in general has difficulty in deterring wrongdoing, the 
deterrent effect of damages being increased by the amount of the 
collateral benefits must surely be negligible. Accordingly we do not 
think that an approach to collateral benefits which diverges from that 
which the compensation aim dictates can be justified on the basis of 
the deterrence it achieves.”
89
 
These attacks on tort law as a deterrent may also be used to undermine the moral 
basis for imposing full liability. Insofar as that moral basis is said to rest upon the 
natural feelings of those injured that the wrongdoer should be made to pay in full, it 
must be noted that many plaintiffs do not harbour such feelings. Those injured by 
members of their family or by workmates may well consider that they should have a 
right to compensation, but not that the wrongdoer should be made to pay 
personally.
90
 Recoupment in such circumstances might prove to be an unwelcome 
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intrusion, and for this reason subrogation against individual employees has been 
abandoned by employers liability insurers.
91
    
Apart from attacking tort law as a deterrent and as inadequately reflecting certain 
moral precepts, the case against the policy of reduction is further weakened by 
emphasing the costs involved in the alternatives. We have already seen that, of all 
the solutions to the problem of overlapping compensation, reduction may be the 
most economically efficient. This is because it avoids not only the high costs which 
may accompany recoupment as described above, but also the waste involved in 
cumulation.  
CONCLUSION 
This article has explored policies relating to an area of law which is central to the 
future development of compensation for personal injury. The inter-relationship of 
schemes is crucial in understanding the overall provision made for those 
incapacitated and disabled in society. However, until recently comparatively little 
attention had been paid to collateral benefits in spite of the regular stream of 
litigation on the subject. The Law Commission review has now brought the area into 
sharper focus. 
The Consultation Paper considers a wide range of options for reform. It  favours, 
to a greater or lesser degree, increasing the extent that benefits are deducted. Its 
most comprehensive option is to deduct all collateral benefit from damages.
92
 It 
generally favours some form of recoupment. Although this article has emphasised in 
a more abstract way the value of this approach, it has also acknowledged the 
qualifications that must be made to it. In particular, the extent of overcompensation 
that results from cumulation can easily be exaggerated, and it may not occur at all in 
many cases. As for the policy of reduction, many of the objections to subsidising the 
tortfeasor lose their force when it is realised that very few defendants pay damages 
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personally. The most desirable solution in any given case inevitably depends upon 
the particular facts. No matter how attractive on the surface recoupment seems to 
be in preventing both the overcompensation of the plaintiff and the subsidising of the 
defendant, it makes no sense to pursue that solution irrespective of the cost involved 
in reallocating the losses. Particular attention must be given to whether subrogation 
rights are sufficiently cost effective to be retained.  
The attraction of moving away from the policy of cumulation is that it avoids one 
of the more wasteful aspects of the present tort system. If the monies saved could 
be more equitably allocated to a wider group of disabled people suffering the same 
injuries then the reform would have many supporters. However, achieving such a 
transfer of resources is somewhat easier said than done. The article therefore 
prompts the following final question: should a welfarist reviewing the tort system 
support cuts in damages now in the hope of the more equitable reallocation of 
resources at some later date, or should a defence be mounted of the existing level 
of support given to the fortunate few who succeed in their common law claim? The 
dilemma, faced by many such as the present author in giving assistance and 
evidence to the Law Commission, is an acute one.  
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